Abstract-Latest technological trends lead toward systems connected to public networks even in critical domains. Bringing together safety and security work is becoming imperative, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. The main objective of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a systematic literature review. The steps of the review are the following: the research questions identification; agreement upon a search string; applying the search string to chosen databases; a selection criterion formulation for the relevant publications filtering; selected papers categorization and analysis. We focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorized as follows: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety-informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; and security-informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH ubiquitous presence of technology and our increased reliance on it, the risk of harm we face due to such technology increases as well. The harm we are exposed to is not just the direct physical harm due to, for example, car accidents, but it includes, e.g., financial, environmental, and emotional harm, which can also lead to physical harm. Traditionally, different causes that may lead to harm have been treated separately in the safety-critical system engineering. For example, unreasonable risk of harm due to malfunctioning behavior of technological systems is addressed under the umbrella of functional safety, where functional safety is described as a freedom from unacceptable risk [1] . With increased connectivity of these systems, the risk of undesirable consequences has increased due to the possibility of an adversary intentionally causing the undesirable consequences. The risk of such intentionally caused harm through the technological systems has been generally addressed by security solutions, which were traditionally analyzed and proposed separately from safety solutions [2] . Security is often defined as a system property that allows the system to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats [3] . Safety engineering and security engineering as a way of addressing safety/security challenges have developed separately. While the malfunctioning behavior addressed by safety engineering was the primary concern in such systems, the increased risk of intentionally caused harm required additional focus on security engineering. Nowadays, there is a need to integrate safety and security engineering in such a way that the unreasonable risk of harm due to either malfunctioning or malicious intent is adequately addressed. This is particularly important for highly connected modern safety-critical systems that cannot be considered safe unless they are secure at the same time. The way in which this integration is performed significantly influences the efforts needed to design a safe and secure system. For example, safety and security solutions do not always support each other, e.g., encrypting a message needed for security reasons increases the time needed to deliver the message, which may increase the delivery time over the required safety threshold. If safety and security are being treated separately and their integration takes place at later development stages, it implies greater effort to harmonize different solutions. As with requirement engineering, the later the inconsistencies are detected, the more work needs to be performed due to repetition. The earlier the integration of safety and security can be achieved, the fewer iterations are needed to harmonize them. We have identified the early system development stages where safety and security analyses are performed as the most critical stage for their harmonization. A significant amount of academic effort is being invested into researching harmonization at early system development stages [4] - [6] . At the same time, state of the practice is lagging behind due to the strict certification and standardization requirements that take longer time to adapt to new developments.
In this paper, we investigate the existing research that addresses the analysis of both safety and security aspects. For this purpose, we present a structured map of the available research literature, focusing on the holistic safety and security analysis by conducting a systematic literature review (SLR) method, as described in Section II. The goal of the study is to get better comprehension of the available safety and security analysis approaches. In particular, we explore what kind of integration the available approaches promote. This information can tell us if the research is converging toward a particular kind of integration, and what are the causes for such convergence. The insights from this study might be useful for both academia and industry, as the first might get a better view of the directions and possible gaps in the state of the art, while the latter can use the study as a source to find suitable co-analysis methods relevant for their domains. We present the results and their analysis in Section III. The classification of the relevant papers is done with respect to type of the approach, where we have identified three categories: security-informed safety, safety-informed security, and combined safety and security approaches. Additionally, we have investigated if the analysis is performed on the hazard/threat identification level or during requirements engineering. Furthermore, we have investigated whether the analyses of both safety and security are unified or they are parallel and need additional harmonization. Finally, we have identified different characteristics of each publication regarding the relation with industry, application domain, relevant standards, and the type of validation used. We discuss validity of presented results in Section IV, followed by Section V, where we present the related work. The final conclusions are described in Section VI.
II. RESEARCH METHOD
The work in this paper is based on a SLR, an empirical study with the purpose to evaluate and interpret all available research relevant to a particular question, topic of interest or phenomenon. We have adopted an approach and guidelines to conduct a SLR proposed by Kitchenham and Charters [7] . The aim of a SLR is to present an impartial evaluation of a research topic using a reliable and rigorous methodology. In the review process, we have adopted a process that defined all steps needed to be taken for a review to account as a SLR. The process includes description of the research questions, search string specification, publication sources identification as well as preliminary study selection criterion and data mapping. The process is depicted in Fig. 1 and the details of individual steps are provided in the following sections.
A. Research Questions
SLRs are driven by a specific purpose translated into a set of research questions, which is the initial step of the study. We formulate the following research questions focusing on the research area of Functional safety and security co-analysis at the early system development stages.
RQ-1:
What are the analysis methods adopted to address interplay of safety and security at the early system development stages? RQ-2: How do the identified analysis methods address the interplay of safety and security?
The main reason for limiting the scope of the work to the early system development stages is the importance of the harmonization of safety and security at those stages for the overall cost and effort needed to design a safe and secure system. Considering the whole development lifecycle could introduce a larger amount of publications that we would not be able to assess in the right way, possibly losing the focus from the main goal. Hence, in this review, we focus on analyses that take part during the hazards and threats identification and risk assessment, and requirements elicitation/analysis. Since both the safety and security engineering promote to design safety and security in the system from the beginning, the selected stages become critical as there we identify the problems and choose ways to address them. The earlier we discover inconsistencies between the chosen solutions, the fewer repetitions are needed. The efforts needed to achieve an adequate design depends on whether the safety and security analyses are performed separately, and then the results are evaluated jointly, or if a unified analysis is performed. Hence, we also investigate the nature of those analyses in more depth.
B. Scope of the Search
In the next step of the study, we have specified the search string that is used to find relevant publications in selected databases. The search string is based on the keywords that are in line with the purpose of the paper, as discussed in Section I. We specify the following Boolean string to search the relevant databases:
("safety" AND "security" AND "analysis").
The following on-line databases have been part of the investigation: IEEE Xplore digital library; 1 ACM digital library; 2 Web of Science 3 ; and SpringerLink. 4 We have performed our search to find suitable publications from year 2012 until the end of 2017. We have restricted the search to journal, conference, and workshop papers as well as peer-reviewed book chapters, while excluding non-peer reviewed abstracts and publications from the search. We have used the Mendeley application to record the search results.
C. Selection Criterion
Our initial search, i.e., Stage 1 in Table I , resulted in 13 711 papers in total. For a paper to be included in the next phase, the following criterion must be met, Criterion 1: the publication must propose or discuss safety and security analysis approaches in system engineering. Thus, at Stage 1 at least one person has read all the titles and excluded papers that have not been related to the inclusion criterion. After this step we have had 351 papers for Stage 2 as given in Table I , where we have read both the titles and abstracts. This step has been performed by all reviewers, i.e., the review authors, with a possibility to grade every paper with one out of three choices: X -paper is not relevant; Table III implies reading of complete papers and includes papers for which at least two reviewers have marked it as relevant ( ). At stage 3, we have evaluated the papers to see whether they include a complete description about an analysis method (i.e., position or work in progress papers have been discarded) that incorporates both safety and security, as well as evaluation on a case study. This approach has provided us with 69 papers to be included at Stage 3 (see Table III ). While reading the full papers, we have had cases when not all reviewers agreed upon whether the paper should be included or not. Such cases have been discussed to make a consensus, and some of these papers have been included in the final list. Within Stage 4, we have identified 33 papers as relevant for addressing our RQ-1 (see Section II-A).
D. Characterization of the Selected Papers
Our selection process resulted in 33 papers on safety and security analysis. Table IV shows the number of papers returned by each source, as well as the number of papers that we have selected after applying the inclusion/exclusion criterion. The table also includes the differences between sources in terms of included studies (precision) and coverage level (recall). The precision of the selected sources, i.e., how many papers are identified as relevant at the Stage 4 out of the initial search result at Stage 1 within a particular search source, varied from 0.1% to 2.4% and recall, i.e., how many papers within a particular search source are identified as relevant out of relevant papers collected from all sources, from 7% to 39%. IEEE Explore and SpringerLink have been the sources with the most selected studies 13) and 14) , and with an average precision of 0.6% and 0.2%, respectively. SpringerLink also has had the highest number of items returned by the query (8479). When it comes to the coverage level, SpringerLink has had the highest coverage (42%), the next is IEEE Explore (39%), then ACM digital library (12%) and Web of Science (WoS) (7%). IEEE Explore, ACM digital library, and SpringerLink have been chosen as prime sources for the search, while WoS has been considered as a secondary source since it covers publications from multiple publishers. Since papers from WoS have been overlapping with the papers identified from the prime sources, only 15 papers from WoS, not already in other databases, have been included in Stage 2 (see Table IV 
E. Data Mapping
In this phase, the 33 selected papers have been categorized into five groups. The classification has been based on titles, abstracts, and full-text reading. A brief description of each group is provided below, while detailed discussion can be found in Section III.
Five groups have been derived based on the following two criteria. First, what is the overall reason for considering both safety and security: to achieve a safe system, to achieve a secure system, or to achieve both safe and secure system. Second, how is the process of performing both safety and security analyses done: jointly -both safety and security analysis are part of the same activity, parallel -safety and security analyses are performed separately, and an additional activity is needed to integrate the results. Based on the first criterion, we identify the following three groups. Combined approaches -safety and security are both the overall target of the analysis. Securityinformed safety approaches -safety is considered as an overall goal. Safety-informed security approaches -methods where performing both safety and security analyses is done for the sake of achieving a secure system. We identify the following two more groups based on the second criterion. Unified approaches -safety and security are analyzed jointly. Parallel approaches -additional harmonization of separate safety and security analyses outcomes is required to address the possible dependencies between safety and security.
Beside this classification, we also take into account the information regarding the application area, existence of validation within the approach, source of publication (i.e., research or industrial community), as well as whether the approach is associated in any way with existing standards (see Table VI ). More detailed classification of retrieved results have been done with respect to which part of the lifecycle the approach is applicable to. We have considered hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) [8] approaches that provide hazard identification, as well as hazard analysis including identification and assessment of environmental conditions along with exposure or duration. Additionally, threat assessment and remediation analysis (TARA) that has been defined in SAE J3061 [9] has been considered. It is an engineering methodology to identify, prioritize, and respond to cyber threats by introducing countermeasures that reduce sensitivity to cyber attack. Finally, we have also considered analysis at the requirement engineering (RE) stage, which is the process of requirements elicitation, analysis, and conflict resolving (see Table VI ).
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first briefly describe papers that are identified as relevant to RQ-1, and further present analysis results of our findings, relevant for answering RQ-2.
A. Papers Identified as Relevant
This section presents a brief overview of the 33 papers ordered in the chronological and alphabetical order that we have identified as relevant.
1) Raspotning et al. (2012) [10] present Combined Harm
Assessment of Safety and Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS) that is a high-level approach combining safety and security methods in order to provide a joint assessments approach, suitable for early phases of system development. The approach is based on modeling misuse cases and misuse sequence diagrams within a UML behavior diagram, which might imply some additional modeling expenses for the early development phase, and provide as an outcome security and safety requirements specification. 2) Reichenbach et al. (2012) [11] propose an approach on combined safety and security risk analysis by extending a threat vulnerability and risk assessment (TVRA) technique with safety integrity levels (SILs) from the generic functional safety standard IEC 61508 [1] . The risk associated with a function in this extended TVRA is calculated based on both security factors as well as SILs of the considered function. The approach aims at identifying which security vulnerabilities are safety-relevant. The technique does not depend on safety analysis, but provides means to identify the influence of security vulnerabilities on safety. 3) Silva and Lopes (2013) [12] present activities that have been performed in order to certify a safety-critical system in the railway domain and describe how security can be taken care of without endangering reliability or safety.
In this paper, they use failure modes, vulnerabilities and effect analysis (FMVEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA), where for every safety failure event they derive possible security failure events. 4) Young and Leveson (2013) [6] propose a STPA-Sec method, which is based on already existing top-down safety hazard analysis method system-theoretic process analysis (STPA). The method requires a multidisciplinary team consisting of security, operations, and domain experts to identify and constrain the system from entering vulnerable states that lead to losses and is useful at the concept phase. In the approach, hazards are presented as control problems. Each control action is reviewed under a set of a different conditions and guidewords to identify loss scenarios. The approach allows us [13] build upon extending the NIST 800-30 [14] methodology to consider safety aspects contributing to risk assessment by establishing a functional relationship between vulnerabilities, threats, and hazards. Hazards occurrence levels are assigned depending on a value of a hazard-threat conditional probability. The assets impact is assigned based on a critical digit asset characterization. These values along with control risk reflecting safety and security design assessment define safety-security risk of an incident. 6) Ito (2014) [15] proposes an analysis for threats and hazards identification as an extension of the hazard identification approach CARDION. The approach is iterative and includes four phases: system sketching; top goal identification and its decomposition; applying hazard and operability study (HAZOP) guidewords to each goal; and threat and hazards identification. System sketching can be performed with UML, SysML, or CATALYSIS [16] . 7) Kriaa et al. (2014) [17] present a case study on an industrial control system in which the previously developed Boolean logic-driven Markov processes (BDMP) formalism is used to model safety and security interdependencies. The approach allows reasoning about antagonism between safety and security, as well as conditional dependence and mutual reinforcement between the two. The case study illustrates the ability of BDMP not only to evaluate risks, but also to optimize the choice of countermeasures against attacks. The analysis is performed as a single joint activity to address both safety and security, but it may depend on other safety/security activities for input. 8) [18] propose the FMVEA, a method based on already existing approach from the safety domain FMEA, described in IEC 60812 [19] . The method incorporates both the failure mode and failure effect model for safety and security cause-effect analysis.
It is a high-level approach suitable for design and verification phase in a system development and for an analysis of only single causes of an effect. In the approach, threats are quantified using threat agents that represent attackers; threat modes are extracted using a STRIDE model [20] that result in threat effects and attack probabilities. Since the analysis depends on the accuracy of a system model, one of the benefits of the approach is a possibility to reuse previously acquired results and redo the analysis in case a new threat or vulnerability is identified [4] . 9) Apvrille and Roudier (2015) [21] propose to use SysMLSec to investigate possible impact of introducing security solutions on safety-related functions for embedded and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). SysML-Sec adapts a goal-oriented approach for capturing requirements and a model-oriented approach for specifying architecture and threats. Within the analysis resources to be protected and their connection to safety and security requirements are identified. The analysis methodology is based on a Y-chart approach [22] and follows V-cycle. The analysis is supported by an open-source software TTool for model specification and verification, and by AVATAR for analyzing requirements and attacks. SysML-Sec assesses compatibility of security requirements with regards to system safety at partitioning and design stages. 10) Cimatti et al. (2015) [23] present an overview of the D-MILS approach for verification of safety and security requirements. Both types of requirements are allocated to the system components and formalized via component contracts. The verification of the requirements in the given system can be performed by checking contract refinement between the contracts of components comprising the system. The result of the refinement analysis can be previewed as fault trees showing the dependencies of the system and component failures. 11) Gu et al. (2015) [24] present an approach for treating safety and security requirements together with a focus on resolving their conflicts. The analysis is based on identification of safety and security goals, their corresponding requirements and a connection between them, i.e., checking whether they undermine or improve each other. A conflict resolution is done based on weighting of resolutions values for conflicted requirements. 12) [25] present an approach for joint risk assessment that can be applied for both design and operational phases of the system development. The S-cube (SCADA safety and security modeling) approach takes as input the system architecture and provides attacks and failures scenarios that may lead to given hazards. The analysis relies on a knowledge base of safety and security risks and uses Figaro language to model different system components, each of which is associated with related failure modes and attacks. 13) Macher et al. (2015) [26] describe security-aware hazard and risk analysis (SAHARA). The method combines two well-known approaches, HARA [27] coming from automotive domain and STRIDE [20] that focuses on threat modeling, to review system design in a methodical way. The result of the method is a quantified security impact on the safety-critical system development. Initially, the safety analysis is done with respect to ISO 26262 and using HARA analysis, while the security analysis is done based on the STRIDE method independently. The results form security analysis are further used in a ASIL quantification concept providing the resulting security level. 14) Popov (2015) [28] presents an approach for stochastic modeling of safety-critical systems considering both random failures and malicious attacks. In particular, the approach considers only those attacks that may lead to elimination of the safe state of the device. By considering probabilistic modeling of both failures and attacks, it is possible to quantify the risk from cyber attacks. 15) Steiner and Liggesmeyer (2015) [29] propose a Security Enhanced Component Fault Trees (SeCFTs) analysis. In order to assign probabilities to security-related causes, i.e., to conduct a quantitative analysis, basic events are grouped into minimal cut sets (MCSs), and probabilities are assigned to sets instead of events. The probabilities values are picked from the discreet set aligned with classification from IEC 61025 [30] . The qualitative analysis within the approach is based on identification of all MCSs and their handling depending on included events nature, i.e., security, safety, or mixed. 16) Wei et al. (2015) [31] describe an approach based on HAZOP, in which they strive toward including securityrelated information into the hazard analysis, and apply it to an open source immobilizer protocol stack. The authors focus on the design phase in the system development and extend the guidewords by reusing the attack taxonomy of the computer emergency response team (CERT). The approach provides a detailed information on a set of primary and secondary guidewords and their combinations. 17) Islam et al. (2016) [32] propose a framework for threat analysis and risk assessment inspired by ISO 26262 [27] . Due to the tight coupling with the automotive safety standard and inspired by the industry, the paper aims at providing a framework readily applicable in the automotive domain. The framework addresses security risks and aligns the proposed security analysis with the ISO 26262 development process. The work aims to ease cocertification of safety and security for a given system. By proposing a security analysis aligned to the existing safety analysis, the approach addresses identification of all properties relevant for safety or security. 18) Nicklas et al. (2016) [33] propose a system-engineeringbased approach that consists of a SySML-based model accompanied with a procedure in order to establish safe and secure design of CPSs. Initially, a system definition is provided via the generic systems engineering analysis and a safety case is described using SySML notation. The combination of these two enables identification of possible attacks scenarios. A qualitative assessment of probabilities of occurrence and goal achievement of the attack scenarios is used to derive security structures containing the limitation of communication and encryption. In the final step, possible safety-security goal conflicts related to the analyzed safety use case are harmonized into a sequence diagram to achieve an adequate safety and security level. [36] proposes a modification of STPA-SEC [6] to support a technical risk analysis for privacy engineering, namely STPA-Priv. The approach is based on the already existing one while introducing the systematic analysis of system controls and their ability to constrain behaviors that might compromise privacy. 22) Troubitsyna (2016) [37] proposes an approach for integrated derivation and analysis of safety and security constraints built on top of the systems thinking paradigm presented by STAMP, and the assurance case structuring via goal structuring notation (GSN). The proposed approach consists of a GSN pattern inspired by STAMP. This paper proposes a joint treatment of safety and security requirements by using the described GSN pattern for their structuring. 23) Dürrwang et al. (2017) [38] describe a security guideword method (SGM) approach used to identify information assets and protection goals relevant for safety where artefacts from the ISO 26262 hazard analysis are reused. SGM is based on security guidewords, useful when identifying possible attack scenarios, similar to HAZOP from safety domain. The approach provides unified safety and security constructs that minimize safety and security integration effort in automotive domain, and enable nonsecurity engineers to identify information assets and protection goals. 24) Friedberg et al. (2017) [39] present a combined analysis method for safety and security called STPA-SafeSec based on STPA [40] and STPA-Sec [6] , and used to choose the most effective mitigation strategies to ensure system safety and security. The benefits of the approach is unified safety and security consideration while choosing suitable mitigation strategies, a possibility to prioritize the most critical system components for an indepth security analysis (e.g., penetration testing). The analysis identifies potential system losses, caused by a specific security or safety vulnerability, and better mitigation strategies.
25) Howard et al. (2017) [41] propose a method to identify
and formally analyze safety and security requirements. This approach is based on the STPA [40] methodology and combined with modeling, traceability, and formal verification through the use of the Event-B formal method. The aim is to generate critical requirements to be able to prevent undesirable system states. Using Event-B language and the Rodin toolset, they demonstrate and verify that these critical requirements fully mitigate against the undesirable system states. 26) Kumar and Stoelinga (2017) [42] propose an approach handling attack-fault trees (AFT) with dynamic gates allowing to consider more complex multiple step scenarios. [43] propose a method combining parts of existing methodologies, STRIDE [20] , and FMEA [19] . These safety and security analyses are divided in two parts with an integration stage after the first parallel activities that provides a combined safety and security threat catalogue. Integration results are further fed into the second part of both methods for impact assessment on the security side and likelihood assessment on the safety side. The approach advantages are saving effort by taking care of commonalities of separate assessments at once, utilizing the combined catalogue to raise awareness on issues that has high impact or likelihood on both areas, and supporting multi-dimensional decisions made by tackling security and safety together. 29) Procter et al. (2017) [44] extend the systematic analysis of faults and errors (SAFE) to provide better integration of security reasoning within safety. In this paper, the authors advocate that the Dolev-Yao model provides better integration of security into safety, the model is extended with guidewords to accommodate both safety and security. 30) Ruijters et al. (2017) [45] present an uniform meta-model allowing to merge attack tree analysis (ATA) and FTA in AFT. The developed tool provides a bidirectional transformation between joined AFT model and independent models. The AFT model can be transferred to UPPAAL for quantitative analysis purposes, e.g., reliability. 31) Sabaliauskaite and Adepu (2017) [46] extend the sixstep model for design of safe and secure CPSs with support for identification of possible failures and cyber attacks. In the first two steps of the approach, the functions/requirements are defined together with the system architecture. In the next two steps, failures and corresponding safety measures are added to the model. In the final two steps, attacks and the corresponding security countermeasures are added to the model. The paper [49] describe a unified approach that enables safety and security co-engineering. The main goal of the approach is to demonstrate the benefit of formal methods when analyzing impact of security to safety and other way around by using Event-B [50] . The initial model is based on the abstract specification, further refined to include system nominal and failure behaviors. The authors consider the effect of security vulnerabilities on system safety.
B. Results
The main information extracted from the papers has been summarized in Table VI . It presents the summary of the following characteristics of the identified papers: 1) whether the approach is associated with any of the relevant safety/security standards; 2) a type of an approach validation presented in the paper; 3) whether the approach is proposed by industry or academia; 4) which is the application area of the approach demonstrated in the paper; and 5) which early system development stages does the work cover, HARA/TARA and/or RE.
The mapping of the relevant papers, as described in Section II-E, is presented in Table VII .
In Table VI , we consider the following types of validation based on the paper text: case study, example, empirical study, or conceptual validation. The latter implies only a sketch of the approach without a concrete example. Moreover, we distinguish between academia-and industry-driven publications based on the origin of the authors as well as the explicit correlation of the used case study or example with a particular company. We have also examined the connection of the proposed approaches with existing safety or security standards. One can notice that the association with a standard is almost in all cases directly related to the targeted application area of the approaches. A large number of papers is aiming at addressing safety/security concerns in the automotive domain, thus using ISO 26262 standard, an international standard for functional safety of electrical and/or electronic systems in automotive domain, followed by generic approaches applicable to any domain, and industrial control systems domain. Furthermore, we have identified which early system development stages do the papers cover with their proposed contributions, identifying whether they cover only one of the two stages, or both.
In Table VII , we have grouped each paper in two categories. One considering the focus of the work. The other identifying the way interdependencies are managed. In the first category (columns in Table VII), we have mapped papers into three groups: 1) safety-informed security; 2) security-informed safety; and 3) combined safety and security approaches. In the second category (rows in Table VII), we investigated whether the work proposes a unified way of analyzing interdependencies between safety and security or a parallel approach where additional harmonization of interdependencies is required. As shown in Table VII , we have not identified works that focus on exploring only the influence of safety on security, i.e., safety-informed security approaches. All publications focus on either exploring the influence of security on safety or exploring the interdependencies between safety and security. This two-step categorization resulted in four groups of papers. In the reminder of the section, we discuss the typical limitations of papers from each group.
Combined safety and security approaches that perform safety and security analyses in parallel are located in the upper-left cell of Table VII . Generally, approaches in this group require an integration activity to harmonize the results of the separate safety and security analyses. While such approaches to analyzing the interplay of safety and security may be the easiest to implement in practice, they may also incur too many iterations needed for harmonizing the conflicting safety and security requirements. For example, Gu et al. (2015) [24] require safety and security mechanisms already in place, while Islam et al. (2016) [32] do not include formulation of technical security requirements for the system nor assumptions regarding the hardware and software levels based on the security level. The most important activity for approaches in this group is the integration activity for harmonizing safety and security analyses results. In this respect, we have identified the need for further improvement of the proposed integration activities in these types of approaches.
Security-informed safety approaches that take safety and security analysis results performed in parallel and analyze the influence of security on safety are presented in the upper-right cell of Table VII . What we can say for all parallel approaches, just as for the previous group, the post safety and security analyses integration activity is the most important aspect. While in the previous group, the activity included analysis of dependencies of both safety on security and vice versa, in this group, only the influence of security on safety is considered. This is appropriate for those systems where security is relevant only if it influences safety. But if the intention is to also have a secure system beyond the safety relevant security issues, then these approaches are not appropriate for such systems as they do not cover analyzing the influence of safety on security. For example, one of the possible limitations of the work presented by Nicklas et al. (2016) [33] , is the lack of information regarding the approach suitability in larger systems where both safety and security may be equally important.
Combined safety and security approaches that propose joint analysis of safety and security and their interdependencies are located in the bottom-left cell of Table VII. In general, this is the group of approaches that support building both safe and secure systems. To reduce the amount of possible iterations that may be incurred by the conflicting safety and security requirements in parallel approaches, this group of approaches proposes new ways of joint safety and security analyses that treat their interdependencies during the analysis. While reducing the number of iterations for harmonizing safety and security is an important goal, the limitation of these methods is that they are generally more complex and would require more time to perform than perhaps two separate activities for analysis of safety and security. Furthermore, these approaches may be more challenging to implement in practice since they require more change to the state of practice for safety and security processes used in companies. A general concern with approaches from this group is the extent to which they support safety and security, i.e., whether they succeed in identifying hazards and vulnerabilities at least as good as the independent methods. For example, Young and Leveson (2013) [6] focus on losses that are results from violations of integrity and availability, while confidentiality is not tackled. Also, the ability of the approach to assist analysts in examining security constraints degradation over time is not addressed. Kriaa et al. (2014) [17] present an approach where it might be difficult to evaluate the parameters associated to the security part of the model. To tackle this they address robustness of the decisions that can be taken, trying to determine decisions that remain valid for a wide range of values of the most uncertain parameters. The approach presented by Cimatti et al. (2015) [23] that relies on the MILS architecture and contract-based method can be seen as a promising approach given that it provides support for modeling the system architecture, contract-based analysis of the architecture, automatic configuration of the platform, and assurance case generation from patterns. However, the approach is very specific and lack of knowledge in this domain might provide incomplete results and there is no support for finer-grained information flow properties handling. Frieberg et al. (2017) [39] consider methods, such as traditional failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), more focused on component failure, while STPA-Sec is regarded as a systems-based hazard analysis. This might question the scalability of the approach as for systems with complex interactions or emergent behavior becomes questionable whether lower level failures and threats are sufficient for system-level analysis [47] .
Approaches proposing a unified way of analyzing safety and security with safety as an overall goal, i.e., unified securityinformed safety approaches, are grouped in the bottom-right cell of Table VII. As this group of approaches is focused on safety as an overall goal, many of them are application specific due to alignment with a specific standard; however, considered approaches are quite mature as limitations are already going into consideration of failures connections and complex attacks. Since the overall focus of this group of approaches is safety, the potential limitation is the application of these approaches in systems where also non-safety-related security issues are important. In such case there would be duplication of work as a part of the security analysis would be performed in the unified security-informed safety activity, and the full security analysis would still have to be performed separately. While this could reduce the amount of possible iterations for harmonizing safety and security, it would still mean duplication of work compared to the combined unified approaches. Furthermore, some of the approaches are domain specific and may require further work to be applied in other areas. For example, since the approach presented by Raspotnig et al. (2012) [10] specifies requirements based on ISO 26262 [27] and HAZOP tables combined with the BDMP [51] technique; thus, a high level of details and good expert knowledge are required. As it depends on the expert knowledge, the reusability in repeated analysis is not applicable since the level of experiences might be different in different teams, potentially affecting results [4] . The approach presented by Silva and Lopes (2013) [12] is also aligned with a standard from the railway domain, and in general depends on the expert knowledge. Given this, the authors have not been completely convinced that the approach would be suitable for other domains without tailoring it to the specific needs. Procter et al. (2017) [44] also aim to extend the SAFE analysis proposed by them to other domains using guidewords. The analysis proposed by [18] is based on FMEA that considers only single causes of an effect, which excludes multi-stage attacks consideration. The method presented by Popov (2015) [28] may require a more complex failure model to address failure dependencies and tradeoffs between safety and security. The approach proposed by Wei et al. (2015) [31] has a limitation in terms of failures connections. As the future work, the authors plan to address more complex dependencies between failures and guidewords used for the analysis, e.g., to consider multistages attacks. Dürrwang et al. (2017) [38] aim to add item attributes in their approach and consider guidewords to cover more complex failure scenarios.
In general, we have noticed that the identified approaches do not focus on the fact that security is dynamic in its nature [52] . This dynamic nature implies frequent system updates as a response to a new attack being developed or a new vulnerability being exploited. Such an update requires change impact analysis to the safety of the system, potentially leading to increase in time and cost. The challenge of efficient incorporation of a system update may limit the applicability of the proposed approaches. Addressing this challenge may be needed for bringing safety and security co-analysis into safety and security-critical systems engineering the state of the practice.
C. Results Analysis
We analyze the information from Tables VI and VII to identify the trends in addressing the dependencies between safety and security.
In Fig. 2 , we present the correlation between the categories from Table VII and the early system development stages the papers focus on. We group the approaches with respect to the early system development stages on those addressing only RE or HARA/TARA, and those addressing both. We can notice that in general for all groups we have more unified than parallel approaches. This is in particular visible, when considering RE, where all approaches focus on unified analysis of both safety and security while exploring the influence of safety on security and vice versa. Furthermore, when it comes to the distribution between security-informed safety and combined safety and security analyses, we can notice from Fig. 2 that approaches addressing only RE or HARA/TARA have approximately equal focus on both. Conversely, the approaches addressing both activities focus on combined safety and security analysis.
In Fig. 3 , we examine trends of addressing the combined analysis on one side, and security-informed safety analyses on the other side, over the years. Over the years, the focus is steadily increasing on the combined safety and security analyses side, while the research on security-informed safety has been in focus for some time already, with increased focus in 2015. The trend of increased focus on combined safety and security analyses is continuing in 2017 as well.
In Fig. 4 , we consider the three most active domains (automotive, generic, and control systems) and explore their focus on the interplay of safety and security. We can notice that most works on combined safety and security analyses address the problem in a generic manner, while the security-informed safety analyses are mostly associated with the automotive domain. In fact, both generic and approaches from the industrial control systems domain put more focus on combined safety and security approaches, while the automotive domain is the only one that focuses on the security-informed safety. Furthermore, we can notice that unified analyses dominate both automotive and generic domains in security-informed safety. Although, unified analyses also dominate combined safety and security approaches, there is quite some works that rely on harmonization of parallel safety and security analyses in this category.
IV. VALIDITY OF RESULTS
As with all empirical studies, there are many threats to validity that may impair the generalizability of the results. In this section, we address the most prominent threats to validity [7] namely publication bias as well as bias in data selection, extraction, and classification. 
A. Publication Bias
A threat that the examined research literature does not represent all the available knowledge on the topic is always present, i.e., due to exclusion of on-line databases that might have relevant publications, in our case Science Direct. Publication bias is one of the reasons that contribute to that threat since positive results are more likely to be published than negative ones. Meaning, solutions that do not work might not get published. In our search, we have focused on three independent publishers and a WoS as a common source. We have focused only on peer-reviewed publications in English, leaving out grey literature such as Ph.D. theses, reports, and papers that have not been peer reviewed. Furthermore, we have seen fewer results from the industry on this topic, which may be due to the fact that an industrial funder chooses not to publish certain results. This may be due to commercial opportunities, but also not to reveal ways in which security vulnerabilities are handled, which may in itself be a security vulnerability if it becomes known that a certain analysis misses certain types of security vulnerabilities. Based on our contacts with industrial practitioners, we believe the risk of this threat is minimal. Nevertheless, we plan to investigate this threat in the future by validating its results with the practitioners.
B. Bias in Data Selection
One of the steps that have been taken in order to identify relevant studies for this review has been discussion on research questions, the inclusion/exclusion criterion, as well as search strategy. We have been able to agree upon research questions and derive from research questions a suitable search string. We have made sure that all involved researches had the same definitions of terms related to this study. Also, our selection process has been divided in several stages in order to further reduce the risk of excluding relevant studies. Furthermore, all authors have been involved in the study selection process based on the inclusion/exclusion criterion. The collected publications have been reviewed first based on their titles and abstracts and in cases when no decision could be made based on the abstracts and titles, a full-text reading was performed to decide about the relevance of the paper for our study.
The decision results from Stage 2 (see Table II ), where the review has been conducted by all three reviewers, i.e., authors of this paper, have been analyzed by means of Cohen's kappa coefficient extended for a case with more than two reviewers and a multiple grading scale [53] . The kappa coefficient for Stage 2 is 0.48, which falls into Moderate Strength Agreement group [54] . A possible cause for the level of agreement being only moderate is the fact that reviewers are coming from three different domains, namely safety, security, and formal methods. To minimize the risk of excluding relevant studies, we have discussed and taken to the next stage all papers that have been marked as relevant by at least two reviewers.
C. Bias in Data Extraction and Misclassification
To reduce the risk of wrong data extraction and classification, all authors have agreed upon the set of information to be extracted from the selected papers. In many cases, we had to interpret information ourselves. For example, whether an approach focuses more on safety or security or both equally, but even simpler information such as validation type, could not be simply extracted, e.g., the type of validation used in a paper could not be simply taken as stated in the paper since different papers consider the same type of validation differently. The case study in one paper is an application example in another, so we chose to interpret ourselves the type of validation, so we could have comparable values. To ensure the agreement over the extracted data and classification, first, each author extracted data from a subset of papers. Then, authors verified each others data by reviewing the papers themselves. All differences were discussed amongst all the authors.
V. RELATED WORK
Safety and security interplay can be considered from many perspectives, e.g., one of the aspects is their joint consideration from a process point of view. Sabaliauskaite and Mathur [55] consider domain lifecycle alignment on an example of ISA84 (IEC 61511) and ISA99 (IEC 62443) standards. An overview of lifecycles provided by standards from both domains is presented by Schmittner et al. [56] , where authors have identified the main phases of safety and security processes and proposed a combined version. However, in this paper, we focus only on analyses related to early system development stages. Chockalingam et al. [57] present a survey on integrated safety and security risk assessments methods and their application domains. An overview of approaches based on attack and fault trees has been presented by Nagaraju et al. [58] . In our review, we consider system analyses without a limitation to a particular approach form; moreover, identified methods have been analyzed depending on more general categories, e.g., association to existing standards, approach validation, etc. In 2013, Piètre-Cambacédès and Bouissou [59] provided a survey on differences and similarities with respect to security and safety approaches, along with their interdependencies and possible adaptation of approaches from one domain into the another. The authors have presented a comprehensive analysis of both domains including operational principles, assessment methods, architectural concepts, and approaches suitable for adaptation in the other domain. Kriaa et al. [5] present a survey on combined safety and security approaches with focus on industrial control applications. The main criteria for the analysis has been lifecycle phases for an approach application, whether integration or unification of an approach is a base for a joint consideration of two domains, and whether it is a qualitative or quantitative method. In contrast to both above-mentioned works, our study is focused on already developed and evaluated approaches, and how safety and security overlap is addressed within them.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have witnessed an increased need of safety and security co-analysis in the recent years. In this paper, we have presented a SLR exploring ways and trends in addressing safety and security co-analysis in system engineering. Since safety and security can negatively influence each other, analyzing their interplay in an efficient manner means reducing the effort that needs to be invested in achieving a safe and secure system. The results of our review indicate that the most works focus on unified safety and security analysis that aims at exploring the influence of both security on safety and vice versa. This is the absolute case for approaches considering both threats/hazards analyses and requirements engineering. Concerning the influence of security on safety within the safety analysis, also referred to as securityinformed safety, the automotive domain is the main driver in that direction. Considering that combined safety and security analysis can be used for both achieving safe and secure systems, we have noticed increase in published research of such analyses for the reviewed period. The results also indicate that there is no work addressing safety within existing security analyses, i.e., safety-informed security analyses. Furthermore, we have identified that many works lack extensive evaluation of the proposed approaches and methodologies. We have also noticed that the identified approaches lack evaluation of their support for efficient system update handling that characterizes the securitycritical systems. The lack of focus on such an important issue regarding the dynamic nature of security and its influence on safety may impair the applicability of the approaches in safetyand security-critical systems. It is evident that more efforts are needed in proposing new and evaluating existing proposals for co-analysis of safety and security in all application areas.
